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City v City: The Case for Full Municipal
Personhood under § 1983
Caswell F. Holloway, INt

NIMBYism breeds conflict.1 In 1999 New Rochelle, a city in
West Chester, New York, sought to build an IKEA superstore.2
The proposed site shared a common border with the town of
Mamaroneck.3 When negotiations between the municipalities
broke down, Mamaroneck passed a local law requiring developers
of significant real estate projects adjacent to, but not within its
borders, to get a permit before starting construction.4 New Rochelle filed suit to enjoin the permitting process on numerous
grounds; chief among these were claims that the local law violated New Rochelle's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.5 The city also sued for damages and attorneys fees under § 1983.6 Following Sixth Circuit precedent, the
Southern District of New York held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect a city against the constitutional torts of a
neighboring city or other intrastate political subdivision.7 The
court also held that New Rochelle was not a "person" capable of
bringing suit under § 1983.8

Under current law, cities are virtually precluded from bringing suit under § 1983, 9 despite the fact that the plain meaning of
t A.B. 1996, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Chicago.

1 NIMBY, or "Not in My Back Yard" is an expression commonly used to define the
aversion of one community to the potentially intrusive developments of its neighbors.
2

City of New Rochelle v Town of Mamaroneck, 111 F Supp 2d 353, 357-58 (S D NY

2000).
3 Id at 357.
4

Id.

5 Id at 357-58. Counts V and VI of New Rochelle's complaint alleged that the local
law was "a taking of its property without due process," including a taking of New Rochelle's right to issue permits for the development of land within its borders. Id at 363.
6 New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 357.
7 Id at 364, citing South Macomb DisposalAuthority v Township of Washington, 790
F2d 500, 505 (6th Cir 1986).

8 New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 368 (agreeing with the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits that "municipalities are not 'persons' who may seek relief under Section
1983").
9 See Parts IIB 1 and IIB 2.

479

480

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2001:

the statute and substantial Supreme Court precedent practically
compel the opposite result. Consequently, cities like New Rochelle must rely on the uncertainties of the political process to
defend against the unconstitutional legislative encroachments of
ambitious neighbors.
The inability of cities to bring suit under § 1983 is not due to
a lack of effort. Political subdivisions have repeatedly attempted
to use the statute to recover against one another, yet none have
succeeded. The most cited reason for this nearly universal failure
is the purported status of cities as "creatures" or instrumentalities of their creating states. ° This argument has satisfied judges
and legal scholars since its most forceful exposition early last century,1" but it confuses the ability of cities to sue their creating
states for Fourteenth Amendment violations with the separate
and distinct question of whether cities can be plaintiffs under
§ 1983.
This Comment argues that municipalities should have a
cause of action under § 1983.12 Such a cause of action will enable
cities to better protect the interests of their citizens and will incentivize local legislators to consider the rights of neighboring
jurisdictions before enacting laws which may hamper those
rights. Granting cities full § 1983 personhood will also eliminate
the substantial judicial confusion between municipal rights vis-Avis their creating states under the Fourteenth Amendment and
municipal rights under § 1983. This Comment will demonstrate
that granting cities full § 1983 personhood will not impair the
rights of the states to form, merge, dissolve, or otherwise control
their political subdivisions. However, granting cities a § 1983
cause of action will give them a legal means of redress-against
both intra- and interstate municipalities-where political processes are clearly inadequate.
10 See Parts II A and II B.
11 See City of Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182, 190 (1923):
A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the State, and
exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the State through its legislative department. The legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the corporation itself, and provide other and different means for
the government of the district comprised within the limits of the former
city. The City is the creature of the state.
(internal citations omitted). See also Part II.
12

The arguments advanced in this Comment apply to all political subdivisions, but

the cases discussed deal exclusively with suits by a political subdivisions against either
their creating states or other intrastate subdivisions. See notes 150-51 and accompanying
text.
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Part I will introduce § 1983 and define the general scope of
the statute. Part II will establish that, under current law, cities
are liable for their constitutional torts under § 1983 but cannot
bring suit under the statute. Part III will present four arguments
for granting cities a cause of action under § 1983. Such an action
(1) is consistent with the plain meaning of § 1983; (2) is prohibited through an incoherent application of the Court's Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence to the question of municipal status
under the statute; (3) is in accord with the independence of cities
established by the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence; and (4) will promote the representation-reinforcing
principles underlying the Court's decision to subject cities to liability under § 1983. Finally, Part IV will address the counterargument that the proposed cause of action is inconsistent with
New Federalism. Although federalism concerns may limit the
scope of a § 1983 cause of action for cities," they are not a bar to
full municipal personhood.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF § 1983

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. It also prohibits the denial of equal protection of the laws. 4
Section 5 of the Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce
its substantive provisions through appropriate legislation. 5 Debate over the scope of congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment has raged since its adoption,"s but there is no doubt
that § 5 "is a positive grant of legislative power to Congress." 7 In
the important case of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer,5 then-Justice Rehnquist noted that there was no doubt that the Amendment "sanc'3See Part IV B.
14 See US Const Amend XIV, § 1. The Amendment provides, in relevant part, that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
15 See id at § 5.
16 See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 619-23 (2000) (discussing
controversial extensions of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment and
noting that "several limitations inherent in § 5's text and constitutional context have been
recognized since the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted").
17 City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 517 (1997) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
18 427 US 445 (1976).
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tioned intrusions by Congress ...into judicial, executive and leg-

islative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states."19
Though extensive, Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment are not unlimited. Indeed, the Court has recently
reasserted its authority to police the boundaries of congressional
enforcement power under § 5.20 While this development may portend an era of heightened scrutiny for new legislation enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 2' numerous statutes,
passed long before the Rehnquist Court, give effect to the
Amendment's substantive provisions. Perhaps best known of
these is Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, known today as
§ 1983.22

A. The Language and Scope of § 1983
Section 1983 gives all persons under the jurisdiction of the
laws of the United States a cause of action against state and local
officials who deprive them of their constitutional rights "under
color of state law."2 The statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.24
The key question for this analysis is the extent to which municipal corporations should be considered "persons" under § 1983.
The term appears twice in the statutory text: first, in reference to
potential § 1983 defendants-persons who act "under color of
state law"-and second, in defining potential § 1983 plaintiffsany "other person" who may be deprived of constitutional rights.

19 Id at 455.
20 See Boerne, 521 US at 536 (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and holding that "the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to
determine if Congress has exceeded itsauthority under the Constitution").
21 See id.
22 Act of April 20, 1871, ch 22, § 1, 17 Stat 13, codified at 42 USC § 1983 (1994).
23 Id.
24 Id (emphasis added).
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It is clear that municipal corporations are persons liable for
constitutional torts under § 1983.25 Equally well-settled is the
right of private corporations to bring suit as § 1983 plaintiffs."
However, nearly every circuit to address the issue has held that a
city is not a person capable of bringing suit under § 1983.27 The
only exception is the Sixth Circuit which, although it recognized
that cities may be "persons" capable of bringing § 1983 suits,"
nonetheless held that the "Fourteenth Amendment ... does not
prescribe guidelines and impose restrictions upon one political
subdivision vis-A-vis another political subdivision."29 Attempting
to understand how courts can hold that a city is a "person" under
the first clause of § 1983, but not under the succeeding clause,
requires consideration of the evolution of municipal status under
the statute.
B.

Municipal Liability from Monroe through Owen

Though enacted in 1871, § 1983 went largely unnoticed until
the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v Pape. 31 Monroe established the right of individuals to pursue a federal remedy against
state government officials under § 1983, regardless of whether
the laws of the state in question provided a means of redressing
25 See Monell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690 (1978) (holding that
"[1local governing bodies ... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory
or injunctive relief'). See also McMillian v Monroe County, 520 US 781, 784 (1997) ("We
held in Monell... that a local government is liable under § 1983 for its policies that cause
constitutional torts.").
26 See, for example, Grossjean v American Press Co, 297 US 233, 244 (1936) ("A corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law
clauses."); Fulton Market Cold Storage Co v PJ Cullerton, 582 F2d 1071, 1079 (7th Cir
1978):

[T]he fact that the plaintiff in this suit is a corporation is of no legal significance. While a corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause, a corporation is a "person" within the
meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Fulton, the corporate plaintiff, may
maintain a § 1983 action to secure the protection and guarantees accorded to it under the Fourteenth Amendment.
27
28

The case law is introduced in Part II.
South Macomb Disposal Authority v Township of Washington, 790 F2d 500, 503

(6th Cir 1986) (noting that "itwould be strained analysis to hold, as a matter of statutory
construction, that a municipal corporation was a 'person' within one clause of section
1983, but not a 'person' within another clause of the same statute").
29

Id at 505.

30 365 US

167 (1961). For a useful and thorough history of § 1983 and its
(re)emergence after Monroe, consider Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv L Rev 1133 (1977) ('Developments").
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constitutional harms suffered at the hands of state officers."1 The
case ushered in a new era of civil rights litigation.2 In expanding
the reach of the statute, however, the Court simultaneously held
that cities and other local governments were not § 1983 persons.33
After an exhaustive review of the legislative history, the Court
concluded that Congress could not have meant to include municipalities as persons under the statute.34
Sixteen years later the Court reversed course, holding in Monell v Department of Social Services35 that the same legislative
history "compel[led] the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies."3 Justice Brennan
further held that the absolute immunity accorded municipalities
by Monroe was a "departure from prior practice" 37 in that the

precedents relied upon wrongly assumed that state-law immuni-

31 See Monroe, 365 US at 183:
Although the legislation was enacted because of conditions that existed in
the South at the time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable
to Illinois as it is to the states whose names were mentioned over and
over again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which,
if enforced, would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked.
32 See Developments, 90 Harv L Rev at 1169 (cited in note 30) ("Monroe v. Pape resurrected section 1983 from ninety years of obscurity.").
33 See id at 1194 ("Monroe ...had the effect of foreclosing, with few exceptions, an
assertion of liability against entities resembling municipal corporations. Townships and
counties, as well as cities have been held exempt from liability.").
34 Monroe, 365 US at 191-92 ("The response of the Congress to the proposal to make
municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within the Act of April 20, 1871,
was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them."). The Monroe Court did not address whether a state is a § 1983
person. The Court deemed the issue settled under Monroe when it addressed the question
fifteen years later. See Fitzpatrick, 427 US at 452 (holding that because cities and other
municipalities were not amenable to suit under § 1983, Congress could "not have intended
to include States as parties defendant"). Although it did not directly address the issue,
Monell v Departmentof Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978), reopened the question of state
status under § 1983. It was not until 1989 that the Court definitively concluded that the
states were not "persons" reachable under the statute. See Will v Michigan Departmentof
State Police, 491 US 58, 64 (1989) ("[W~e reaffirm today what we concluded prior to Monell... that a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983."). Will is addressed in
Part IV.
3) 436 US 658 (1978).
36 Id at 690 (allowing female employees of the city of New York to bring a § 1983 suit
against the city challenging a policy that required pregnant workers to take unpaid leaves
of absence).
37 Id at 695.
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ties overrode a § 1983 cause of action against cities." Monell exposed local governments to liability for monetary, declaratory and
injunctive relief under federal law, 39 but the case was silent on
40
the question of a city's ability to bring suit as a § 1983 plaintiff.
Two years later, in Owen v City of Independence,4 Chief of
Police George D. Owen used § 1983 to sue the city of Independence, Missouri, for unlawful discharge. 42 The Eighth Circuit ruled
in favor of the city on the grounds that its officials had acted in
good faith.43 The Supreme Court, again through Justice Brennan,
reversed.44 Beginning with the observation that the language of
§ 1983 establishes absolute liability,45 the Court reasoned that
the qualified immunity bestowed by the Eighth Circuit was permissible only if it was well-established at the time § 1983 was
enacted.46 Under this test, "neither history nor policy support[ed]
a construction of § 1983 that would justify the qualified immunity
accorded the city of Independence."4 7
Thus, while Monell did not resolve the full scope of municipal
liability under § 1983, Owen and other progeny leave no doubt
that municipalities are "persons" under the statute. 48 Nonethe38 Id at 696 n 59 ("Each case cited by Monroe ... is consistent with the position that
local governments were not § 1983 'persons' reached its conclusion by assuming that statelaw immunities overrode the § 1983 cause of action. This has never been the law.").
39 Monell, 436 US at 690.
40 The Court explicitly stated that it had "no occasion to address ... what the full
contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be," but had "attempted to sketch only so
much of the § 1983 cause of action against a local government as is apparent from the
history of the 1871 Act" and the Court's prior cases. Id at 695. Further development of the
§ 1983 cause of action against municipalities was left to another day. See id.
41 445 US 622 (1980).
42 Id at 625.
43 Id at 625-26.

44 Id at 625.

45 Owen, 445 US at 635 quoting Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 417 (1976).
46

Owen, 445 US at 638.

47 Id.

48 Owen rejected qualified immunity for municipalities when their officials act in good
faith, see 445 US at 650, but municipal liability is not absolute under Monell and its progeny. Rather, a city is liable "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under
§ 1983." Monell, 436 US at 694. Monell "unquestionably" involved official policy as "the
moving force of the constitutional violation" at issue. Id. However, Monell explicitly rejected liability based on a theory of respondeat superior, holding that "a local government
may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Id.
Subsequently, the Court unanimously reaffirmed and clarified Monell, holding that,
where a "municipal policy or custom cause[s] the constitutional injury," a city enjoys no
"immunity from suit-either absolute or qualified-under § 1983." Leatherman v Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 US 163, 166 (1993). Thus, to
assert a valid § 1983 claim against a city, a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy
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less, lower federal courts have restricted municipal personhood to
cases where cities are sued as § 1983 defendants, uniformly refusing to grant them a cause of action under the statute.
II. MuNicIPAL (HALF-)PERSONHOOD UNDER § 1983

If cities are persons under § 1983, then New Rochelle should
be able to bring suit against Mamaroneck to recover damages for
the latter's allegedly unconstitutional permitting processes.49 This

is not the law. Virtually every court to address the issue has prevented cities and other political subdivisions from bringing suit
against each other under § 1983."0 Courts have rejected intermunicipal claims on the theory that even if the language of
§ 1983 permits suits between political subdivisions, the Fourteenth Amendment simply does not operate in favor of one such
city against another. Although courts use slightly different routes
to arrive at this conclusion, the rule is grounded in the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Trenton v New Jersey."
A. The Trenton Rule
In 1923, the City of Trenton attempted to sue the State of
New Jersey to invalidate a state-imposed licensing fee on water
taken from the Delaware River. 2 The city claimed that the fee
was a taking of property without just compensation or due process of law.53 The Court flatly rejected Trenton's claim. Describing
the city as a "creature of the State" which exercised powers and

was the cause of an alleged constitutional tort. See McMillian v Monroe County, 520 US
781, 784-85 (1997). See also Lessie Gilstrap Fitzpatrick, Note, Limiting MunicipalLiability in Section 1983 Litigation: McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 35 Houston L Rev
1357, 1381-83 (1998) (discussing potential limitations on the scope of municipal liability
under § 1983 in light of McMillian). For additional commentary on the scope of municipal
liability under § 1983, consider Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy, BalancingFederalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability under Section 1983, 62 S Cal L Rev 539
(1989). The full contours of municipal liability under § 1983 are beyond the scope of this
Comment. However, it is assumed that cities, should they be granted a § 1983 cause of
action, would have to establish liability in the same manner as any other § 1983 person.
49 See notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
50 The District Court of Puerto Rico is the lone exception. See Santiago Collazo v
FranquiAcosta, 721 F Supp 385, 393 (D Puerto Rico 1989) (allowing the city of Vieques to
bring a § 1983 claim against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on the grounds that the
"municipality has rights secured by the Constitution and laws enforceable under § 1983")
(internal quotations omitted).
51 262 US 182, 190 (1923).
52 See id at 184.
53 See id at 183.
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privileges subject to the will of its creator,5 4 the Court held that
the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment simply "do
not apply as against the state in favor of its own municipalities"
(the "Trenton rule").55
Justice Butler engaged in a lengthy examination of the
Court's city/state jurisprudence, basing his holding on the fact
that cities, like other political subdivisions, are created by the
state to act as agents in the exercise of a clearly defined set of
state powers. 6 Quoting the Court's earlier decision in Hunter v
57 Justice
City of Pittsburgh,
Butler reasoned that because political
subdivisions are, fundamentally, agents of their creators, the
"'number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state."'5 5 Trenton
and its progeny led to the eventual prohibition of constitutional
preemption suits by political subdivisions against their creating
54 See id at 187.

262 US at 192.
Id at 185-86.
57 207 US 161 (1907). Hunter involved a Fourteenth Amendment claim brought by the
city of Allegheny against neighboring Pittsburgh. See id at 164-65, 167. In 1906, the
Pennsylvania legislature passed a bill detailing procedures under which adjacent cities
could merge. See id at 161. Pittsburgh sought to merge with Allegheny pursuant to the
statute, and Allegheny sued to prevent enforcement of a decree ordering that the cities be
joined. See id at 164. Allegheny claimed that the merger would violate both the Contract
Clause and the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id at 167. The Court denied all requested relief, holding that "[miunicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them." Id at 178.
Hunter is recognized as a key precedent in the development of the Trenton rule, and
may figure more prominently than Trenton in the development of municipal rights (or lack
thereof) under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, for example, Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364
US 339, 342 (1960) (describing Hunter as the Court's "leading case" on the political power
of the States in relation to their political subdivisions); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting
55 Trenton,
56

the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures'

Control, 97 Mich L Rev 1201, 1208-11 (1999) (discussing problems with the Trenton rule).
Hills does not use the same terminology as this Comment, but discusses the rule in terms
of Hunter and the venerable Trustees of DartmouthCollege v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat)

518 (1819). See Hills, 97 Mich L Rev at 1208 (tying Hunter and Dartmouth College to the
"notion that local governments are creatures of the state, agencies that the state government is free to destroy or alter as it pleases") (internal quotations omitted). For the purposes of this Comment, which is not primarily concerned with the historical development
of the rule, Trenton is an adequate proxy for the prohibition of Fourteenth Amendment
suits brought by a political subdivision against its creating state. For a comprehensive
discussion of the city as a legal entity, consider Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1059 (1980). For a more detailed treatment of municipal status under
Trenton's antecedents, see id at 1099-1120 (focusing on Trustees of DartmouthCollege).
58 Trenton, 262 US at 186, quoting Hunter, 207 US at 178-79. For a more extensive

discussion of the possible rationales for the Trenton rule and its relation to municipal
status under § 1983, see Part III C.
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states.5 9 Over time, courts used the rule to deny cities a cause of
action under § 1983.60
59 See generally E.B. Schulz, The Effects of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment Upon the Power of the States to Control Municipal Corporations,36 Mich L

Rev 385, 396-97 (1938) (concluding that Trenton and its progeny have removed "any lingering doubts, created by dicta in earlier cases, regarding the soundness of an assertion to
the effect that the contract, due process and equal protection clauses of the national Constitution afford no protection whatever to municipal corporations, in their own right, as
against the powers of the states to control them"). The Article provides an excellent historical overview of the various constitutional stratagems employed by cities against their
creating states early last century.
The Trenton rule is no longer as robust as Schulz suggests. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, however, this Comment assumes that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on
constitutional suits by municipalities against their creating states is valid. See notes 11719 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, a brief treatment of Trenton's current status
highlights the complexity of the constitutional status of municipal corporations, a status
that will undoubtedly be important to a city's future pursuit of constitutional redress
under § 1983. Since its decision in Gomillion, 364 US 339, the Supreme Court has retreated from the seemingly absolutist position of Trenton and its antecedents. In Gomillion, where the Court permitted residents of Tuskegee to challenge a state-enacted redistricting plan as violative of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the city and the
State of Alabama argued that the Trenton rule precluded any judicial interference in a
state's dealings with its municipalities. See id at 340-44 (discussing Hunter, Trenton, and
other cases). In the process of deciding for the disenfranchised residents of Tuskegee,
Justice Frankfurter substantially recast the Trenton line of cases:
[I]n dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution ...

it

is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete
situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in
disregard of variant controlling facts. Thus, a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter [v City of Pittsburgh] and kindred cases

is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that the State's authority is unrestrained by the
particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in those cases.
Id at 343-44. Frankfurter further called into question the supposedly limitless powers of
the state in relation to its political subdivisions that followed from Trenton, noting that
"the Court has never acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with
municipal corporations regardless of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities,
no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the
United States Constitution." Id at 344-45.
Since Gomillion, political subdivisions have succeeded in asserting constitutional
claims against their creators in a number of contexts. Perhaps the most important of the
post-Gomillion cases is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rogers v Brockette, 588 F2d 1057
(5th Cir 1979). The Rogers court allowed a Texas school district to challenge a state statute requiring participation in a federally subsidized breakfast program on the grounds
that the requirement ran afoul of the Supremacy Clause. See 588 F2d at 1059-60. See
generally Comment, Municipal Corporation Standing to Sue the State: Rogers v. Brock-

ette, 93 Harv L Rev 586 (1980) (examining the Rogers decision and discussing its significance in relation to Hunter). Rogers contributed substantially to a thorough reassessment
of the constitutional rights of political subdivisions, particularly where a municipality
claims that a federal statute preempts state law. As a result, the contours of the constitutional rights of municipalities are in flux, and a thorough examination of the debate is
beyond the scope of this Comment.

479]

B.

A § 1983 CAUSE OFACTIONFOR CITIES

489

The Trenton Rule and the Denial of § 1983 Personhood

In City of New Rochelle v Town of Mamaroneck,61 the Southern District of New York held that a city was not a "person" capable of bringing suit under the statute.62 In dismissing New Rochelle's complaint, Judge McMahon conducted a close examination of municipal rights under § 1983, noting a split among the
circuit courts on the question of whether a city can bring suit as a
§ 1983 plaintiff.6 3 Technically, the observation is correct. The
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have specifically held that
a municipality is not a "person" capable of bringing suit under
§ 1983, despite its potential liability to suit under the statute. 4
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit appears to hold that municipalities are full-fledged § 1983 persons. An examination of
this split reveals that it is more apparent than real.
1. Courts that explicitly deny municipalities a cause of
action under § 1983.
When it dismissed New Rochelle's § 1983 claims, the Southern District of New York followed the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, holding that municipalities could not bring suit as
Nonetheless, two points are in order. First, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit,
see notes 117-19 and accompanying text, every circuit court to address the issue recognizes that the states are not completely immune from constitutional attack by their political subdivisions. See, for example, South Macomb, 790 F2d at 504-05 (noting that "[tihere
may be occasions in which a political subdivision is not prevented, by virtue of its status
as a subdivision of the state, from challenging the constitutionality of state legislation"
and discussing Rogers, Gomillion, and others cases); PalomarPomerado Health System v
Belshe, 180 F3d 1104, 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir 1999) (Hawkins concurring) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit has never "satisfactorily stated [its] rationale" for the per se ban and expressing his belief that although "[tihe existence of a contrary view in other circuits does
not automatically suggest a need to reexamine our own position . . . where the other circuits' view is well and thoroughly reasoned, we should at least satisfy ourselves that our
position is grounded in an equally solid rationale"). Second, the ability of municipalities to
assert constitutional claims against the state does not necessarily mean they will be able
to do so under § 1983. It is well-established that the states are not persons under the statute. See Will v MichiganDepartment of State Police, 491 US 58, 63-64 (1989). This aspect
of the § 1983 cause of action is explored at length in Part IV.
60 See Part II B.
61 111 F Supp 2d 353 (S D NY 2000).
62 See id at 368.
63 Id.
64 See Appling County v Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F2d 1301, 1308
(5th Cir 1980); Rockford Board of Education School District No 205 v Illinois State Board
of Education, 150 F3d 686, 688 (7th Cir 1998); United States v State of Alabama, 791 F2d
1450, 1456 (11th Cir 1986).
65 See New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 368.
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§ 1983 plaintiffs.66 Courts reaching this conclusion rely principally on the Fifth Circuit's decision in City of Safety Harbor v
Birchfield6 7 that § 1983 was intended to "'provide private parties a
cause of action for abuses of official authority which resulted in
the deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities."'6 8 A critical fact, glossed over by the Southern District and
other courts, is that Safety Harborwas decided two years before
Monell, when Monroe was controlling on the issue of municipal
personhood under § 1983.69
In Safety Harbor, the city brought a § 1983 action against
four state legislators who allegedly conspired to pass legislation
"which operated to impair the obligations of an agreement between Safety Harbor and two other Florida cities."" The district
court dismissed the suit primarily on the grounds that, in light of
Monroe, Safety Harbor was not a proper plaintiff under § 1983."'
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis of the case with its conclusion that the district court's holding was a proper extension of
Monroe.7 2 The city responded that, despite Monroe, it would make
"little sense to deny municipal corporations relief under the Civil
Rights Act in cases where private individuals could recover."73 To
address this argument, the court turned to Trenton, under which
"municipal corporations have repeatedly been denied the right to
See id.
529 F2d 1251 (5th Cir 1976).
68 Id at 1255, quoting Moor v County of Alameda, 411 US 693, 699 (1973).
69 Monroe explicitly held that municipalities were not persons under § 1983. See 365
US at 191. See also Part I B. These courts do not ignore Monell, but hold that Safety Harbor's interpretation of the congressional intent behind the passage of § 1983 "remains
valid" in Monell's wake. See New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 368 (collecting the opinions of
these courts and characterizing them as standing for the continued validity of Safety Har66
67

bor). Other courts reject this reasoning. See Santiago Collazo v Franqui Acosta, 721 F

Supp 385, 393 (D Puerto Rico 1989) (noting that in light of Monell it is "obvious that
Safety Harbor is no longer correct").
70 529 F2d at 1253.

See id.
Id (citations omitted).
73 Id. The counterargument is a useful reminder that private corporations are "persons" capable of brining suit under § 1983. See note 26 and accompanying text. The Fifth
Circuit's cursory treatment of Safety Harbor's counterargument obfuscates its later conclusion that the legislators sued by the city were protected from § 1983 liability by the
common law doctrine of legislative immunity. See Safety Harbor,529 F2d at 1256. It thus
appears that a private individual would not have been able to recover under the circumstances of Safety Harbor.Note that the legislative enactments of municipal governments,
unlike state legislators, are not immune to a § 1983 attack under Owen and its progeny.
71

72

See, for example, Leatherman v Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination

Unit, 507 US 163, 166 (1993) (holding that municipalities are liable under § 1983 for policies that cause constitutional torts), citing Owen, 445 US at 650.
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challenge legislation ...violative of the Federal Constitution.7 4
Writing for the Safety Harbor court, Judge Ainsworth concluded
that the difference between public and private corporations developed in Trenton and its antecedents was particularly apt in
this case," given the Monroe Court's "exhaustive review" of the
legislative history of § 1983.76 It was the Monroe examination,
rejected in Monell, that led to the Fifth Circuit's embrace of Congress's alleged intent to create a cause of action for "private persons"-but not for public corporations-when it enacted § 1983."7
The New Rochelle court also relied on a post-Monell Fifth
Circuit decision, Appling County v Municipal Electric
Authority of
Georgia," in rejecting the city's § 1983 claims.79 In 1980 the
County of Appling brought a § 1983 suit against the Municipal
Electric Authority of the state of Georgia ("MEAG") challenging
the tax-exempt status of property held by the Authority. ° The
property tax exemption was part of the state legislation creating
MEAG.81 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the county's claims on the
grounds that it had "no standing to invoke the federal
[c]onstitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
74 Safety Harbor, 529 F2d at 1254-55 (discussing Trenton and subsequent cases)
(citations omitted).
75 The primary focus of Judge Ainsworth's discussion was Trenton, but he briefly
mentioned Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, which he described as the "landmark" case defining the distinction between public and private corporations. Safety Harbor, 529 F2d at 1254:

Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, it has been apparent that public entities which are political
subdivisions of states do not possess constitutional rights, such as the
right to be free from state impairment of contractual obligations, in the
same sense as private corporations or individuals.
(citations omitted). A full treatment of the rights of cities vis-&-vis their creating states is
beyond the scope of this Comment. Ainsworth's characterization is nonetheless relevant
because it highlights a persistent problem in the application of the Trenton rule to intermunicipal § 1983 suits: the tendency to frame the issue as a question of municipal rights
in relation to the states rather than in relation to other political subdivisions. See Parts
III B and III C.
76 See Safety Harbor,529 F2d at 1255 (concluding that "[t]he fact that public entities
are not right-holders in the same sense as private parties has particular relevance in
determining whether a municipality is a 'person' entitled to bring suit" under § 1983 because the Supreme Court, after an "exhaustive review" of the legislative history of the
1871 Civil Rights Act in Monroe, concluded that the statute was intended to provide relief
for private parties) (citations omitted).
77 The development of municipal liability under § 1983 is discussed in Part I B.
78 621 F2d 1301 (5th Cir 1980).
79 Id at 1303.
80 Id.
81

Id.
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against an enactment of the state of Georgia." 2 The county argued that Monell established its status as a "person" under
§ 1983.83 Turning to the Trenton rule the court disagreed, holding
that "Monell did not call into question the principle that a city or
county cannot challenge a state statute on Federal Constitutional
grounds."84 The other cases cited in New Rochelle provide no additional substantive support for denying cities a cause of action under § 1983.85
When it dismissed New Rochelle's § 1983 claim against
Mamaroneck, the New Rochelle court expressly adopted the reasoning of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits that Monellwhich exposed cities to liability as persons under § 1983-did not
hold that cities were "proper" § 1983 plaintiffs.86 The preceding
analysis shows that these precedents are grounded in two rationales: (1) an interpretation of congressional intent explicitly rejected in Monell and (2) the Trenton rule.
2. The Sixth Circuit's technical embrace of full
municipal personhood.
In reaching its holding, the New Rochelle court recognized
and rejected the Sixth Circuit's ostensibly contrary holding in
South Macomb Disposal Authority v Township of Washington.8 7
In 1986, the South Macomb Disposal Authority ("SMDA"), a muAppling County, 621 F2d at 1307.
83 Id at 1308.
84 Id. (citations omitted) (discussing Trenton and other cases).
85 For a list of the cases, see note 64 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit
simply followed Appling County, which is no surprise, given that the court was formerly
part of the Fifth Circuit. See United States v State of Alabama, 791 F2d 1450, 1456 (11th
Cir 1986). As for the Seventh Circuit, the New Rochelle court recognized its holding as
dictum. See 111 F Supp 2d at 368, discussing Rockford Board of EducationSchool District
No 205 v Illinois State Board of Education, 150 F3d 686, 688 (7th Cir 1988). Judge Posner
provides two citations to support the proposition that "a city or other municipality cannot
bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Rockford Board of Education School District No 205,
150 F3d at 688, citing City of Chicago v Lindley, 66 F3d 819, 823 n 6 (7th Cir 1995); City of
East St Louis v CircuitCourt, 986 F2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir 1993). Interestingly, one precedent is itself dicta. See Lindley, 66 F3d at 823 n 6 ("We note that various decisions recognize that '[miunicipalities cannot challenge state action on federal constitutional grounds
because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,' and therefore hold that the municipality 'cannot bring a section 1983 claim' against the State")
(internal citations omitted). The second case relies on the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Village of Arlington Heights v Regional TransportationAuthority, 653 F2d 1149, 1152-53
(7th Cir 1981), which is part of the case law used to support the outcome in South
Macomb. For a discussion of this line of precedent, see Parts II B 2 and III B. Arlington
Heights is discussed in notes 215-19.
86 See New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 368.
87 790 F2d 500, 503 (6th Cir 1986).
82

4791

A § 1983 CAUSE OFACTIONFOR CITIES

493

nicipal corporation organized under the laws of Michigan, sued
the Township of Washington ("Township") under § 1983.88 SMDA
alleged that permitting requirements imposed by the Township
exceeded the demands made on other parties seeking similar
permits.89 The court recognized that "in light of Monell, it would
be strained analysis to hold, as a matter of statutory construction, that a municipal corporation was a 'person' within one
clause of § 1983, but not a 'person' within another clause of the
same statute."" This admission is the basis of the "split" described in New Rochelle, for although the Sixth Circuit does not
say so explicitly, the implication is that municipalities are in fact
full-fledged "persons" under § 1983.91 Substantively, however, the
Sixth Circuit is in complete agreement with its sister circuits and
the Southern District of New York.
Although the South Macomb court identified an interpretive
dilemma inherent in § 1983, it did not hold in favor of SMDA.
Rather, the court relied on the "body of law" that examines
whether a municipal corporation "may assert constitutional
claims against its creating state or a political subdivisions
thereof."92 In other words, the court turned to Trenton.9" However,
because the case involved a § 1983 suit between two political
subdivisions of the state of Michigan, rather than a § 1983 challenge by a political subdivision against its creating state, the
court apparently felt compelled to address the distinction. After
setting out the Trenton rule, the South Macomb court held that
"[flor the same reasons, a political subdivision of a state cannot
challenge the constitutionality of another political subdivision's
ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds."94 The
court did not reiterate those "reasons," nor did it explain its application of Trenton, a Fourteenth Amendment case, to a § 1983
suit between two political subdivisions.

88 Id at 501.
89 Id.
90 Id at 503. The court also discussed Safety Harbor,recognizing that the Fifth Circuit

did not have the "benefit" of Monell. See id.
91 See New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 368 (claiming that the Sixth Circuit reached a
conclusion opposed to the holdings of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits when it
recognized the interpretive problem inherent in limiting § 1983 municipal personhood to
cases in which municipalities are defendants).
92 South Macomb, 790 F2d at 504.
93 See id, quoting Trenton, 262 US at 187 ("Being a subdivision of the state, the 'State
may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges [from a municipality] as it sees
fit.").
94 South Macomb, 790 F2d at 505.
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The Sixth Circuit did not cut South Macomb from whole
cloth. Judge Contie cited decisions of the Ninth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits to support the court's position that political subdivisions could not assert Fourteenth Amendment claims against one
another.95 As with the precedents relied upon by the New Rochelle
court,96 the case law relied upon in South Macomb does not support a rule of law prohibiting § 1983 suits between political subdivisions. Nonetheless, Trenton and its progeny are the foundation upon which courts deny cities a § 1983 cause of action.
III. COURTS SHOULD ACCORD CITIES FULL

PERSONHOOD UNDER § 1983

If cities are § 1983 persons, they should have a cause of action under the statute. Under current law, municipalities bear
the burdens of § 1983 liability, yet, by operation of the Trenton
rule, they cannot use the statute to redress the unconstitutional
acts of parties-such as neighboring municipalities-who, unlike
the state, neither created nor have the power to destroy them.
The analysis that follows will show that granting cities a § 1983
cause of action (1) is consistent with the plain meaning of the
statute; (2) is prohibited only through an incoherent application
of the Trenton rule to municipal status under § 1983; (3) will enable courts to cast aside the Trenton rule in favor of a stable legal
framework that analyzes municipal personhood under the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence; and finally,
(4) will promote the representation reinforcing principles underlying the Court's decision to expose municipalities to § 1983 liability in Monell and its progeny.
A. Courts Should Adopt a Plain and Consistent Treatment of
Cities under § 1983
It is well-established under the "plain meaning" rule that,
where the meaning of statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court need look no further than the statutory text to resolve a dispute.97 Thus, if the plain meaning of "person" as used in
95 Id, citing Town of Ball v Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F2d 1049, 1051 n 1 (5th
Cir 1984); Village of Arlington Heights v Regional TransportationAuthority, 653 F2d
1149, 1153 (7th Cir 1981); City of South Lake Tahoe v CaliforniaTahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 625 F2d 231, 233 (9th Cir 1980). These cases are addressed in Part III B 2.
96 See Part II B 1.
97 See, for example, Robinson v Shell Oil, 519 US 337, 340 (1997) ("Our first step in
interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and un-
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§ 1983 includes municipalities, then cities should have a cause of
action under the statute. By its terms, the text of § 1983 applies
to persons both as potential defendants and as plaintiffs capable
of vindicating their constitutional rights. 8 The Supreme Court
has never ruled on the question of whether a city can bring suit
as a § 1983 plaintiff. As a matter of interpretive mechanics, however, if a city is plainly a person under the first clause of the statute, then it must also be a person under the second clause. Several courts have recognized this interpretive dilemma,99 but only
one has
reached a decision consistent with the plain meaning
00
rule.
The canon of consistent meaning buttresses this analysis.
The canon is simply the "normal rule of statutory construction
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning."'0 ' Courts often invoke the
canon to bring coherence to different parts of a large statutory
scheme, such as the Social Security Act.0 2 Certainly, the rule
should apply with equal force to shorter statutes. Section 1983 is
a single sentence that uses the term "person" twice in successive
clauses. Although courts struggle to inject the common law of
city/state relations into the interpretive analysis of municipal
rights under § 1983,03 one cannot help but conclude that the
ambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must
cease if the statutory language is unambiguous .. ."); United States v Ron PairEnterprises, Inc, 489 US 235, 241 (1989) (noting that the task of resolving a dispute over the
meaning of a statute "begins where all such inquiries begin: with the language of the
statute itself' and concluding that "it is also where the inquiry should end ... for where
...the statute's language is plain the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms").
98 See Part I A.
99 See, for example, South Macomb, 790 F2d at 503; Santiago Collazo v Franqui
Acosta, 721 F Supp 385, 393 (D Puerto Rico 1989) ("In enacting § 1983 Congress surely
could not have intended the word 'person' to have two different meanings-if it wanted to
include municipalities as defendants but not as plaintiffs, it would have used different
language to describe the potential parties in each group."). But see BarbaraZ v Obradovich, 937 F Supp 710, 722 (N D Ill 1996) (disagreeing with Santiago Collazo and holding
that "absent Seventh Circuit or Supreme Court precedent to the contrary," a political
subdivision is "not an 'other person' that can sue (as opposed to being sued) within the
meaning of section 1983"). South Macomb is discussed at length in Parts II B 2 and III B.
100 See Santiago Collazo, 721 F Supp at 393 (holding that the city of Vieques was an
"other person" entitled to bring suit under § 1983).
101 See Sullivan v Stroop, 496 US 478, 484 (citations omitted) (holding that the term
"child support" had the same meaning in parts A and D of Title II of the Social Security
Act).
102

See id.

103

See, for example, South Macomb, 790 F2d at 503 (acknowledging the principle

behind the consistent meaning analysis but holding that the "outcome in [the] case [was]
dictated by a different body of law, which analyzes whether the appellant, as a municipal
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canon requires that cities be permitted to bring suit under the
statute. By adopting a plain, consistent interpretation, courts
could eliminate substantial incoherence in this area of the law.
B.

Municipal Half-Personhood is Not Supported by Trenton

Whether they specifically reject § 1983 personhood for cities... or accept it and nonetheless deny municipal § 1983 claims," 5
it is clear that courts rely, in substance, on Trenton to deny municipalities a § 1983 cause of action. Such reliance is untenable
for three reasons: (1) the ability of cities to sue their states under
the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant to the question of
whether a city, as a § 1983 person, has a cause of action against
other § 1983 persons; (2) even assuming that Trenton can inform
the analysis of municipal personhood, the precedents relied upon
to deny cities a § 1983 cause of action deal not with the relationships among political subdivisions, but exclusively with the relationship between cities and their creating states; and (3) as a result, the rationale of Trenton is completely eviscerated when the
rule is applied to prohibit inter-municipal § 1983 suits.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.
As an initial matter, it should be apparent from the language
and scope of § 1983' that Trenton, which established a rule of
city/state relations under the Fourteenth Amendment,0 7 does not
support denying cities a § 1983 cause of action. It is beyond question that Congress was acting within the scope of its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted § 1983."08

corporation, may assert constitutional claims against its creating state, or political subdivisions thereofn. For a discussion of South Macomb and other related cases, see Part II B.
104 See Part II B 1.
105 See Part II B 2.
106

See Part I A.

See Trenton, 262 US at 192 (holding that the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment "do not apply as against the State in favor of its own municipalities"). See also Part
II A.
10s See Monroe, 365 US at 171 (holding that § 1983 "was one of the means whereby
Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce
the provisions of that Amendment"). To assert a valid claim under § 1983, one need only
allege "facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Because Monroe held that cities were not "persons"
under the statute, claims of "constitutional deprivations" could not be asserted against
them. See Part I B. However, after the birth of municipal personhood in Monell, the
analysis in Part III A demonstrates that cities should have the same rights as every other
§ 1983 person.
107

4791

A § 1983 CAUSE OFACTIONFOR CITIES

497

Therefore, if municipalities are persons under the statute, they
have a legitimate cause of action against any other § 1983 person.
This is so because the enactment of § 1983 abrogated any immunity from suits brought by municipalities against § 1983 persons
prior to the statute's enactment, just as any immunity enjoyed by
cities was "obviously abrogated by the passage" of the statute. 9
By this simple logic, any substantive Fourteenth Amendment
limitations on municipal power must fall outside the scope of
§ 1983, and are thus irrelevant to this analysis.
2. Trenton does not support the prohibition on a § 1983
cause of action for cities.
Although it ultimately denied SMDA's claims against Washington Township, 110 the Sixth Circuit recognized that Monell
changed the status of municipalities under § 1983. Faced with
the apparent anomaly of labeling municipalities "persons" vulnerable to, but not "persons" capable of bringing suit, the South
Macomb court turned to Trenton and its focus on the relationship
between states and the cities they create."'
Relying on Trenton, the South Macomb court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not operate in favor of one political
subdivision against another."2 However, the precedents used to
reach this result involved direct challenges to states and state
legislation, not municipal challenges to local laws such as those
at issue in New Rochelle" 3 and South Macomb itself' Though

An obvious question that arises is whether municipalities have Fourteenth Amendment rights. Trenton provides a clear answer to this question in the context of city/state
relations: the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not operate in favor of a city as
against its creating state. See Part II A. However, the Trenton rule does not address the
constitutional rights of political subdivisions in relation to each other. In any case, it is
clear that political subdivisions can assert constitutional claims in a number of contexts.
See note 59 and accompanying text. This Comment argues that, unless a municipality
attempts to use § 1983 against its creating state (or an arm of that state) it should be free
to assert § 1983 claims against other § 1983 persons. See Parts III C and IV.
109 Owen, 445 US at 647.
110 For an extensive discussion of South Macomb, see Part II B 2.
111 See South Macomb, 790 F2d at 504, quoting Trenton, 262 US at 187 ("[Tlhe 'State
may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges [from a municipality] as it sees fit.
However great or small its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the State exercising
and holding powers and privileges subject to sovereign will."') (brackets in original). As
with many judicial treatments of municipal rights, the court did not limit its discussion to
Trenton. See South Macomb, 790 F2d at 504-05. See also note 57 and accompanying text.
112

790 F2d at 505.

113 See notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
114 See Part II B 2.
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ostensibly supported by three precedents," 5 the Sixth Circuit's
denial to SMDA of a § 1983 cause of action is dependent on the
Ninth Circuit's decision in City of South Lake Tahoe v California
Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency." 6 In that case, the court denied
the city of South Lake Tahoe standing to sue the California Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,117 establishing what is now recognized
as the circuit's per se ban on constitutional suits between both a
political subdivision and its creating state and such suits between
political subdivisions." 8
South Lake Tahoe is notable for its reliance on the Supreme
Court's decision in City of New Orleans v New Orleans WaterWorks Co.'19 This 1891 case appears to be the origin of the extension of Trenton to § 1983 suits between political subdivisions. Yet
New Orleans Water-Works does not address the status of political
subdivisions qua subdivisions, but only supports what Trenton
definitively established thirty years later-the inability of politi-

115 See Town of Ball v Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F2d 1049, 1051 n 1 (5th Cir
1984); Village of Arlington Heights v Regional TransportationAuthority, 653 F2d 1149,
1153 (7th Cir 1981); City of South Lake Tahoe v California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 625 F2d 231, 233 (9th Cir 1980).
116 625 F2d 231 (9th Cir 1980). The Seventh Circuit case cited in South Macomb relies
on South Lake Tahoe. See Arlington Heights, 653 F2d at 1152-53. In an example of extreme circularity, the third precedent relies on both South Lake Tahoe and Arlington
Heights. See Ball, 746 F2d at 1052.
"I See 625 F2d at 233. In 1980, the City of South Lake Tahoe and its mayor sued the
California Regional Planning Agency, alleging that land use regulations promulgated by
the Agency took "property without just compensation and arbitrarily discriminate[ed]
between similarly situated property owners in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution." Id at 232. In a logical progression similar to the one
undertaken in South Macomb, see Part II B, the court invoked Trenton for the proposition
that political subdivisions cannot use the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the validity
of state statutes. See id at 233. In summary fashion, the court then declared the rule true
"whether the defendant is the state itself or another of the state's political subdivisions."
Id.
118 See, for example, Burbank-Glendale-PasadenaAirport Authority v City of Burbank,
136 F3d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir 1998) (upholding the "per se rule," established in South Lake
Tahoe, barring a political subdivision of a state from challenging the constitutionality of a
state statute.); Palomar Pomerado Health System v Belshe, 180 F3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir
1999) ("Under established Ninth Circuit law political subdivisions of a state may not challenge the validity of a state statute in a federal court on federal constitutional grounds.
This is true whether the defendant is the state itself or another of the state's political
subdivisions.") (internal quotations omitted). The acceptance of the Ninth Circuit's position (or lack thereof) is addressed briefly in note 59.
119 142 US 79 (1891). Judge Wallace also relied on Judge Weick's dissenting opinion in
Akron Board of Education v State Board of Education, 490 F2d 1285 (6th Cir 1974), which
itself relied on New Orleans Water-Works. See Akron Board of Education v State Board of
Education, 490 F2d at 1297-98.
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cal subdivisions to challenge enactments of their creating states
on federal constitutional grounds.12 °
In New Orleans Water-Works, Orleans parish sued the city of
New Orleans and a municipal waterworks on the grounds that
both an 1884 enactment of the state legislature and a city ordinance violated the Contract Clause.'2 1 The Court analyzed the
parish's claims as a challenge to the state, holding that the city,
as a creature of Louisiana, did not "stand in a position to claim
the benefit of the [Contract Clause], since its charter [could] be
amended, changed, or even abolished at the will of the legislature."'2 2 As such, Justice Brown dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction.'2 3
It appears that the South Lake Tahoe court seized upon New
Orleans Water-Works because the parish sued the city and the
waterworks, both of which were political subdivisions of Louisiana. It is true that Orleans Parish challenged both a state statute
and a local ordinance, but the ordinance merely operationalized a
state law.' 24 It was the 1884 Act that required the city to pay for
its water; the municipal ordinance did no more than set the terms
of payment.'2 5 In denying the parish's constitutional challenge to
the city's alleged impairment of the contract between itself and
the waterworks, the Court explicitly held that the "contract was
120 Compare Trenton, 262 US at 192 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment "do[es]
not apply as against the State in favor of its own municipalities"), with New Orleans Water-Works, 142 US at 89 ("[Tjhe city, being a municipal corporation and the creature of the
state legislature does not stand in a position to claim the benefit of the constitutional
provision in question, since its charter can be amended, changed, or even abolished at the
will of the legislature."). This Comment discusses the rule in terms of Trenton. See note 57
and accompanying text.
121 See New Orleans Water-Works, 142 US at 84. In 1877, the Louisiana State Legislature exempted the New Orleans Water-Works from taxation in consideration for supplying
all municipal water needs to the city of New Orleans free of charge. Id at 80. The state
required the Water-Works to pay taxes when the legislature amended the Act in 1878, and
in 1884 the state passed legislation requiring the city to pay for any water supplied to it.
Id at 80-81. Pursuant to the 1884 enactment, the city passed an ordinance authorizing
payment to NOWW. Id. The parish claimed that both the 1884 Act and the ordinance
impaired the original contract between the latter two entities as embodied in the Act of
1877. See id at 84-90 (noting that the contract relied upon in the case was "that contained
in section 11 of the act of 1877").
122 New Orleans Water-Works, 142 US at 89.
123 Id at 93 ("As there is no federal question properly presented in this case, the motion

to dismiss is granted.").
124 See New Orleans Water-Works, 142 US at 88 (holding that the contract "was in
reality between the state and the Water-Works Company").
125 See id at 81 ("[A]cting under [the 1884 state] statute, the city council, in September,
1884, passed an ordinance ... authorizing the mayor to enter into a contract with the
[Water-Works].").
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in reality between the state and the water-works company. " "'
This fact triggered application of the Trenton rule, destroying the
parish's constitutional claim.12 7
Read together, New Orleans Water-Works, South Lake Tahoe
and Trenton purportedly establish three points. First, political
subdivisions cannot bring Fourteenth Amendment challenges
against their creating states.'28 Second, courts extend the rule to
deny municipalities a § 1983 cause of action.'2 9 Third, the precedents used to support this extension involved disputes between
political subdivisions and their creating states, not a challenge by
one political subdivision to the acts or enactments of another.1 3
Therefore, the denial to cities of full § 1983 personhood is derived
not from an examination of the historical or legal relationships
among political subdivisions, but through rote application of
Trenton to inter-municipal disputes. Yet, the rationales underlying Trenton have only an attenuated connection (if any) to suits
between political subdivisions. Furthermore, the treatment of
states under § 1983 insures that granting cities a cause of action
under the statute preserves the Trenton principal.
C.

The Rationale of Trenton and the Viability of Full
§ 1983 Personhood

The Trenton rule is grounded in the fact that municipalities
are created by the states to serve as agents in the performance of
state functions.' Commentators recognize that the rule is not
the most coherent of doctrines and question the adequacy of a
justification based exclusively on a city's status as the creation of
its state.'32 Recent scholarship suggests that it is more fruitful to
frame the issue in terms of state autonomy and (where federal
law is concerned) New Federalism.'3 3 Relatedly, one could argue
as a matter of policy that any independent power of a political
subdivision to use the Constitution and federal laws to preempt
its creator "undermine[s] the efficacy of ...local self governId.
Of course, Trenton was not decided until three decades after New Orleans WaterWorks. The label is used for the reasons discussed in note 57 and accompanying text.
128 See, for example, Trenton, 262 US at 192. See also Parts II A and II B.
129 This is the precise result of both South Lake Tahoe and South Macomb.
130 For a discussion of these cases, see Parts II B 1,11 B 2, and III B.
131 See, for example, Trenton, 262 US at 185-86.
132 See note 59 and accompanying text.
133 See Alexander Willscher, Note, The Justiciabilityof Municipal Preemption Challenges to State Law, 67 U Chi L Rev 243, 255-57 (2000); Hills, 97 Mich L Rev at 1211-16
(cited in note 57).
126

127

479]

A § 1983 CAUSE OFACTION FOR CITIES

ance."134 Regardless of which rationale(s) one finds intellectually
satisfying, neither the "creature" theory nor federalism principles
provide coherent support for the limitation of municipal personhood under § 1983.
The City of New Rochelle brought suit against Mamaroneck
under § 1983 for the latter's allegedly unconstitutional enactment
of a local permitting process. 135 Ultimately, New Rochelle's § 1983
complaint was dismissed "[flor the same reasons" that the city
would be unable to challenge a statute enacted by the State of
New York.136 The preceding analysis offers several potential articulations of those reasons: a city's status as a creature of its
creator; federalism principles; or sound public policy. Yet, New
Rochelle was neither a creature of Mamaroneck, nor did it seek to
invalidate a state statute. 3 v Furthermore, if "local governance"
means that states should be free to determine their own internal
organization, it is difficult to see how allowing New Rochelle to
proceed against Mamaroneck under § 1983 undermines the ability of the State of New York to eliminate, merge,"' or otherwise
rearrange either entity. The only scenario that might implicate
these concerns is one in which granting a city a § 1983 cause of
action enabled it to sue the state itself. However, such an action
is clearly prohibited by the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, United States citizens cannot sue the states in federal court.'3 9 The scope of the Amendment
is an important consideration in defining the scope of § 1983.14°
Not until seventeen years after Monell, in Will v Michigan Department of State Police,' did the Supreme Court definitively
hold that the states were not persons under § 1983.142 In Quern v
134
135
136

Hills, 97 Mich L Rev at 1216 (cited in note 57).
See New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 357. See also notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
South Macomb, 790 F2d at 505. This quote applies equally to the New Rochelle

court which, like the South Macomb court, used the Trenton rule to reach its holding. See
New Rochelle, 111 F Supp at 368. See also Part II B.
137 See notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
138 See, for example, Hunter, 207 US 161, 179 (refusing to prevent the merger of Allegheny into Pittsburgh). See also note 57 and accompanying text.
139 The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." US Const Amend XI.
140 See Will v Michigan Departmentof State Police, 491 US 58, 66-67 (1989).
141 491 US 58 (1989).
142 Id at 63-64. There is extensive commentary on Will and the scope of § 1983. See,
for example, William Burnham and Michael C. Fayz, The State as a "Non-Person"Under
Section 1983: Some Comments on Will and Suggestions for the Future, 70 Or L Rev 1
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Jordan,' the Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
precluded § 1983 suits against the states in federal court.' Will,
however, involved a § 1983 claim brought against the state of
Michigan in its own courts, where the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply.145

Although not directly implicated in Will, the Eleventh
Amendment provided the basis for the Court's finding that the
states are not reachable under § 1983.146 Thus, under Will, the
states are "non-persons," just as municipalities were "nonpersons" prior to Monell.'47 Although not decided on the same
terms as Trenton, Will preserves the Trenton rule under § 1983,
for § 1983 persons cannot sue the states under the statute. Therefore, allowing cities to bring suit as § 1983 persons does not open
the states to suit by their political subdivisions. On the other
hand, cities such as New Rochelle would be permitted to bring
suit against Mamaroneck, subject to the limitations established
in Monell and its progeny. 4 ' Based on the facts of New Rochelle,
Mamaroneck's action appears to fall squarely within the "policy"
enactments at the heart of municipal liability under § 1983.'4
(1991) (challenging, among other things, the Court's failure to examine the legislative
history of § 1983).
143 440 US 332 (1979).
144 See id. See also Will, 440 US at 66 (holding that § 1983 does not override the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Id.
145 See Will, 491 US at 63-64 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in
state courts).
146 Justice White began Will with the observation that § 1983 "does not provide a [federal] forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State" unless the state has waived
immunity or Congress has overridden it through legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 66. He further noted that, in deciding Quern, the Court
held that Congress did not intend to "alter the federal-state balance" when it enacted
§ 1983. Id. It followed that Congress could not have meant to deny persons a federal forum
against the states while at the same time allowing them to proceed in state courts. See id.
Sensitive to the fact that his reasoning looked suspiciously like an application of
the Eleventh Amendment to state courts, Justice White pointed out that the Court's holding did not mean that the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 were
coterminus, but because the Eleventh Amendment was important to determining "congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983," the Court (somewhat circularly) refused to
"disregard it." Id at 66-67. Commentators have expressed surprise at the Will Court's
analysis. See, for example, Burnham and Fayz, 71 Or L Rev at 20-25 (cited in note 142)
("Even if we assume that Congress would have indulged in the radical confusion that the
Eleventh Amendment applied in state court, there is nothing to indicate that Congress
would have thought that the Eleventh Amendment applied to bar federal law claims, even
in federal court.").
147 See Part I B.
148 See note 48 and accompanying text.
149 See, for example, Leatherman v Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, 507 US 163, 166 (1993), citing Owen, 445 US at 650 ("[A] municipality
can be sued under § 1983, but it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom

479]

A § 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CITIES

503

The preceding analysis reveals that using Trenton to bar
municipal suits under § 1983 has no sound basis in precedent or
policy. In addition, although every case discussed thus far deals
with suits between intrastate political subdivisions or between a
subdivision and its creating state, the denial of full personhood to
municipalities prevents them from bringing suit against out-ofstate subdivisions that may commit constitutional torts. 5 ' In the
context of § 1983 suits between interstate political subdivisions, it
should be clear that the Trenton rationale has no traction whatsoever.151 Whether a city chooses to bring suit against an intrastate neighbor or a municipality in a different state, granting cities full personhood under § 1983 will rectify substantial incoherence in both § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the grant will recognize and clarify the distinction
between city/state relations under the Fourteenth Amendment
and the status of cities under § 1983. In so doing, courts will also
promote the important policies that first led the Supreme Court
to recognize municipalities as § 1983 persons.
D.

Full Personhood Is Compelled by the Immunity Principles
Established in Monell and Its Progeny

Thus far, this Comment has examined the question of municipal personhood in terms of cities as potential § 1983 plaintiffs.
Granting cities a cause of action under § 1983 will also have salutary effects on municipalities such as Mamaroneck, who may face
liability from a new source once cities are granted full personhood.
Municipal liability under § 1983 is part and parcel of the "expansive sweep of the statutory language," which does not expressly include any common-law immunities.152 Nonetheless, the
Court has read certain immunities into § 1983 on the grounds
that Congress, had it intended to abolish them through § 1983,
would have done so expressly.15 3 In those cases, as in any where
sued under § 1983, but it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused
the constitutional injury."). See also note 48 and accompanying text.
150 This is a peculiar feature of the case law in this area. Interstate, inter-municipal
§ 1983 claims, though certainly conceivable, are not addressed in any of the cases discussed in this Comment.
151 The point is almost self-evident. The Trenton rule prevents cities from asserting
constitutional claims against their creating states. In the case of a § 1983 claim brought by
one city against another that happens to be across a state line, the rule is not implicated.
152 See Owen, 443 US at 635-63.
153 Id at 637, quoting Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547, 555 (1967). Pierson reestablished the
absolute immunity of judges from § 1983 liability. 386 US at 553-54. Other examples
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the Court immunizes an entity from the reach of § 1983, the immunization is "predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded" the entity or official at common law
"and the interests behind it." '54
With respect to cities, the Court determined that there was
no history of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither
"history nor policy" supported granting them even qualified
§ 1983 immunity.15 5 "By 1871," Justice Brennan noted, "municipalities-like private corporations-were treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory
analysis."'56 It is clear that private corporations are "persons" capable of bringing suit under § 1983,157 a fact that supports a construction of the statute enabling municipal corporations to do
likewise. However, the Court did acknowledge two doctrines that
had afforded cities limited protection from liability. One distinguished between a city's governmental and proprietary functions,
and the second immunized municipalities for 'discretionary' or
'legislative' activities, but not for those 'ministerial' in nature." '
With regard to the governmental/proprietary dichotomy, cities
were traditionally immune from suits arising out of "governmental" functions, but were liable for their private or proprietary acts
to the same extent as any private corporation.'
include absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity for prison officials. See
Owen, 445 US at 637-38 (collecting cases).
154 Owen, 443 US at 638.
155 Id.
156 Id at 639, citing Monell, 436 US at 687-88 (emphasis added).
157 See note 26 and accompanying text.
158 Owen, 445 US at 644.
159 Id. The governmental/proprietary distinction is rooted in the common law concept
of sovereign immunity. See Eugene McQuillin, 18 Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 53.02.10 (Callaghan 3d ed 1987). Generally, when a city functions in a governmental
capacity, it is simply an extension of its creator and is, like the state itself, immune from
suit. See id at § 53.29. On the other hand, when a city acts in a proprietary capacity, it
faces the same liability as any private corporation. See id. For example, a city is usually
immune from liability for a tort committed by a firefighter if the tort occurs in the course
of fighting a fire. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 131 at 1053 (West
5th ed 1984). However, if the city operates an electric company, and charges fees, the
activity "looks" proprietary and a tort committed in the operation of the utility will give
rise to municipal liability. Id at 1052-53.
Interestingly, both the South Macomb and New Rochelle courts claim that the question of a municipality's ability to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim against its creating state when the municipality acts in a proprietary capacity remains unresolved. See
South Macomb, 790 F2d at 504; New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 365. Given the fact that
states are not reachable as persons under § 1983, Will, 491 US at 63-64, such a claim is
clearly untenable under the statute. The governmental/proprietary distinction remains
relevant. See, for example, Postscript:Tracing the Governmental Proprietary Test, 53 U
Cin L Rev 561, 584 (1984) ("As long as the notion persists that governments cannot govern
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Dealing first with the governmental/proprietary issue, the
Owen Court noted that the distinction was an outgrowth of sovereign immunity and conducted a rather lengthy examination of
the doctrine. 6 ° Ultimately, Justice Brennan concluded that a
municipality's governmental immunity was clearly eliminated by
Congress's enactment of § 1983.161 In other words, by including
municipalities in the universe of § 1983 persons, Congress "abolished whatever vestige of the State's sovereign immunity the
municipality possessed."'62
Turning next to the discretionary/ministerial distinction, the
Court established that this source of municipal immunity grew
not out of sovereign immunity, but from a need to preserve the
separation of powers.'6 3 The doctrine developed to limit judicial
encroachment on the reasonableness of a city's policy judgments."' Despite the fact that a municipality has wide latitude in
exercising its judgment as to fiscal and other policies, the Court
rejected the discretionary/ministerial distinction as grounds for
municipal § 1983 immunity. Because a municipality has "no discretion to violate the Federal Constitution," Justice Brennan held
that "when a court passes judgment on a municipality's conduct
in a § 1983 action, it does not seek to ...interfere with the local
government's resolution of competing policy considerations ...
but looks only to whether the municipality has conformed to the
requirements of the Federal Constitution and statutes."6 5
Owen thus provides two persuasive policy rationales for
granting cities full personhood under § 1983. Allowing municipalities to bring suit as § 1983 plaintiffs is consistent with both
the parallel treatment of private and municipal corporations under the statute, 166 and the Owen Court's conclusion that Congress
eliminated any "vestige" of municipal immunity when it included
municipal corporations within the ambit of § 1983.167

effectively without some degree of immunity, courts and legislatures have.., a basis for
bisecting the range of municipal functions into immune and nonimmune activities."). A
city's ability to bring a claim against its creator as a municipal proprietor is, however,
beyond the scope of this Comment.
160 See Owen, 445 US at 644-48.

163

Id at 647.
Id at 648-49.
Id at 648.

164

See Owen, 445 US at 648.

165

Id at 649.

166

Id at 638-39. See also note 26 and accompanying text.
Owen, 445 US at 647-50.

161
162

167

506

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2001:

Representation Reinforcement

E.

Granting cities a cause of action under § 1983 will enable
them to better defend the interests of their citizens and will increase the accountability of local legislatures. The notion of legislative accountability is at the heart of the Court's decision to impose § 1983 liability on municipalities under Monell and its progeny.' In Owen, Justice Brennan noted that § 1983 was intended
not only as a means of compensation for persons deprived of their
constitutional rights, but also as a "deterrent against future constitutional deprivations."'69 The Court reasoned that municipal
liability would create an incentive for legislators and other officials who might harbor doubts about the constitutionality of a
proposed course of action to "err on the side of protecting ... con-

stitutional rights." 7 ° Although the Court does not use the language of externalities analysis, its holding appears to be motivated by a desire to force local legislatures to internalize the costs
of enactments that might have a negative impact on individual
citizens or, in this context, neighboring towns. This motivation is
also apparent in Justice Brennan's conclusion that the threat of
damages might encourage policymakers to "institute internal
rules and programs designed to minimize unintentional infringements on constitutional rights."''
Owen involved the allegedly unconstitutional dismissal of a
police officer, but the arguments supporting municipal liability in
that context apply with equal force to permit suit by a city seeking to protect its development rights against the legislative encroachment of an unhappy neighbor. This is precisely what New
Rochelle sought to do in its suit against Mamaroneck. 7 ' Some
commentators suggest that intrastate political processes adequately protect cities like New Rochelle, 7' but New Rochelle involved an intensely local dispute.' Without representation in the
Mamaroneck city council, it is difficult to envision how New Ro168

Monell, 436 US at 690 (holding that local governing bodies can be sued directly

under § 1983).
169 See Owen, 445 US at 651.
171

Id at 651-52.
Id at 652.

172

See notes 2-8 and accompanying text

170

173 See, for example, Willscher, 67 U Chi L Rev at 258-60 (cited in note 133) ("Cities
are fully represented, and their grievances are resolvable by, the state legislature."). Willscher discusses the point in terms of a municipality's right to challenge state statutes. See
id at 243-44. While this scenario is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is relevant to the
inter-municipal context.
174 See New Rochelle, 111 F Supp 2d at 356-57.
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chelle could obtain meaningful redress for Mamaroneck's intrusive permit requirements through the political process-absent a
policy of legislative retaliation. If New Rochelle had § 1983 at its
disposal, this dispute appears to be one in which the threat of
damages would induce a town like Mamaroneck to think twice
175
before it legislates.

IV. LINGERING FEDERALISM CONCERNS

Despite the clear distinction between municipal suits against
the state and municipal personhood under § 1983, the prospect of
enabling cities to use the statute against other state-created entities may nonetheless raise federalism concerns. Section 1983 is,
after all, a statute designed to vindicate federal rights. 176 The Supreme Court has recently revitalized federalism-and invalidated
substantial pieces of federal legislation--in a series of highly publicized cases. 17 7 Although decided long before this resurgence,
cases such as Trenton and New Orleans Water-Works, which prohibit cities from using the Constitution against their creating
states, are consistent with the Rehnquist Court's renewed sensitivity to state sovereignty.17 To address this concern, courts
should limit § 1983 actions by political subdivisions to those cases
in which the subdivision acts "independently." To this end, the
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence can be
helpful in determining when a political subdivision should have a
§ 1983 cause of action, and when it should.

175 For example, Mamaroneck may lobby the New York state legislature to pass a law
requiring permits of the sort it sought to impose throughout the state. The costs involved
in passing such legislation would likely be much higher than the costs of passing a local
law, but it is clear that a state statute would be immune to a § 1983 attack. See Part IV A.
176 Section § 1983 was enacted to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself. See Monroe, 365 US at 171. See also Part I.

177 See, for example, Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 933 (1997) (striking down a

provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on the grounds that the provision improperly required states to administer a federal regulatory program); Lopez v
United States, 514 US 549, 642-43 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 because of the lack of a "concrete tie" between firearm possession and interstate
commerce).
178 The cases are discussed in Parts II A and III B. See also note 120 and accompanying text. For a survey of the Rehnquist Court's substantial work in this area, see Robert
H. Freilich, Adrienne H. Wyker and Leslie Eriksen Harris, Federalismat the Millenium: A
Review of U.S. Supreme Court Cases Affecting State and Local Government, 31 Urban Law

683, 722-40 (1999).
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The Status of Political Subdivisions under the
Eleventh Amendment

The Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment
is an important consideration in determining the scope of
§ 1983.19 By its terms, the Amendment prohibits suits "against

one of the United States." 8 ' However, it is well-settled that the
proscription includes not only actions in which a state is a named
party, but also "certain actions against state agents and state
instrumentalities." 8 ' In contrast, the Amendment generally does
not extend to cities and other municipalities." 2 Generally, where
a court determines that the state, rather than one of its officers or
political subdivisions, is "the real, substantial party in interest,"
Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the individual or political subdivision." 3 Because political subdivisions may be identified with the state when they conduct certain activities,18 4 granting a cause of action to every political subdivision because they
are labeled as such could result in substantial interference with
the sovereignty of the states.
To determine whether and when a particular political subdivision, such as a school board, is entitled to share in the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of its creating state, a court must determine whether the entity is "an arm of the state," in which case it
179 See Will, 491 US at 66-67 ("[I]n deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of
§ 1983, the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a
reading of § 1983 that disregards it."). Will is introduced in Part III C.
180 US Const Amend XI.
'81 Regents of the University of Californiav Doe, 519 US 425, 429 (1997).
182 Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v Doyle, 429 US 274, 280
(1977). The Court's 1890 decision in Lincoln County v Luning established the rule. 133 US
529, 530 (1890):

[W]hile [a] county is territorially part of the state, yet politically it is also
a corporation created by, and with such powers as are given to it by the
state. In this respect, it is a part of the state only in the remote sense in
which any city, town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a
part of the state.
The wisdom of Lincoln County is a subject of continuing debate, particularly in light of the
revitalization of federalism by the Rehnquist Court. See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag,
Should PoliticalSubdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DePaul L
Rev 577 (1994) (exploring the consequences of municipal liability but concluding that it
may be preferable to an otherwise absolute immunity). This issue is explored briefly in
Part IN D.
183 Regents of the University of California, 519 US at 429 (citing cases). See also note
186 and accompanying text.
184 See Will, 491 US at 70 ("[Olur holding here does not cast any doubt on Monell, and
applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the State' for
Eleventh Amendment purposes.").
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is immune, "or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation
or other political subdivision, to which the Eleventh Amendment
does not extend."'8 5 The "arm of the state" doctrine, sometimes
referred to as the Mt. Healthy test,'8 6 is widely used by lower federal courts when faced with the question of
a particular entity's
87
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
Courts have developed numerous variations of the Mt.
Healthy inquiry; consequently, the number of factors considered
in determining whether a particular entity is "independent" differs across circuits. 8 Regardless of the specific number of factors
185 Id.
186 Of course, Mt. Healthy is not the only source for the inquiry. See, for example,
Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 663 (1974), quoting Ford Motor Co v Department of
Treasury, 323 US 459, 464 (1945) (holding it "well established that even though a State is
not named a party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment" and reiterating that "[wihen the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to
invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants'"). See also note 187 and accompanying text.
187 This Comment argues that municipalities should be able to bring a § 1983 action
after a structured inquiry identical to the inquiry made under the Court's "arm of the
state doctrine." It is beyond doubt that the Mt. Healthy inquiry is well-accepted. See, for
example, Lester H v Gilhool, 916 F2d 865, 870 (3d Cir 1990), citing Mt. Healthy, 429 US at
280 ("To determine whether the School District is insulated by Eleventh Amendment
immunity, we must decide whether a Pennsylvania school district is an alter ego of the
state of Pennsylvania. This depends on the powers granted the school district by the
state."); Gary A v New Trier High School District No 203, 796 F2d 940, 945 n 8 (7th Cir
1986) quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 280 ("The Mt. Healthy test for whether an entity is
an arm of the state is fact specific. Courts are instructed to look at the 'nature of the entity
created by state law.'"); Hadley v North Arkansas Community Technical College, 76 F3d
1437, 1438 (8th Cir 1996), quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 280 (noting that Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not extend to independent political subdivisions created by
the State, such as counties and cities, and holding that the question to be decided is
whether the entity in question "is to be treated as an arm of the state.. . or is instead to
be treated as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision to which the Eleventh
Amendment does not extend"); Sturdevant v Paulsen, 218 F3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir 2000),
quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 280 (noting that the "inquiry under the arm of the state is
... whether [the entity in question] is 'more like a county or city than ... like an arm of
the state"); Ambus v Granite Board of Education, 975 F2d 1555, 1560 (10th Cir 1992)

(same).

188 Compare Belanger v Madera Unified School District, 963 F2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir
1992) (finding the following factors relevant to determining whether a governmental
agency is an arm of the state: "[1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of
state funds, [2] whether the entity performs central government functions, [31 whether the
entity may sue or be sued, [4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its own
name or only in the name of the state and [5] the corporate status of the entity"), with

Sturdevant, 218 F3d at 1164 (noting that in applying the Mt. Healthy test, the court must

examine two things: [1] "the degree of autonomy given to the agency, as determined by the
characterization of the agency by state law and the extent of guidance and control exercised by the state," and [2] "the extent of financing the agency receives independent of the
state treasury and its ability to provide for its own financing").
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considered, it is clear that a political subdivision does not share
in the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity if there are "persuasive indicia" that the subdivision occupies an "independent
status" relative to its creating state.'89 Courts must glean such
indicia from a careful examination of the state laws governing the
entity in question. 9 ' These factors may include the power to sue
and be sued; the power to buy, hold and sell land; or the power to
levy taxes.' 9 ' Ultimately, courts must judge the independence of
any particular entity on a case-by-case basis. The Mt. Healthy
test, however, which by its terms requires a court to determine
whether a particular entity more closely approximates a county
or city than an arm of the state,'92 suggests that most cities possess an independence rendering them unable to share in the
Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by their creating states.
B. Using Mt. Healthy to Cabin § 1983 Actions Initiated by
Political Subdivisions
This Comment began with the story of New Rochelle's efforts
to build a retail outlet within its borders.'93 To see how the arm of
the state doctrine would enable cities like New Rochelle to fend
off the encroachments of ambitious neighbors and still preserve
the sovereignty of the states, it is useful to return to the facts of
that case. Under current law, New Rochelle cannot sue
Mamaroneck "for the same reasons" that it cannot sue the State
of New York.'

4 Yet,

if Mamaroneck neither created New Rochelle

nor partakes of New York's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, it is not clear what those reasons are.'95
189 See, for example, Moor v County of Alameda, 411 US 693, 719-20 (1973) (holding
that California counties did not share in the Eleventh Amendment immunity).
190 Regents of the University of California,519 US at 430 n 5 ("Ultimately... whether
a particular state agency has the same kind of independent status as a county or is instead an arm of the State, and therefore 'one of the United States' within the meaning of
the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of federal law. But that federal question can be
answered only after considering the provisions of the state law that define the agency's
character.").
191 See, for example, Moor, 411 US at 719-20. See generally note 187 and accompanying text.
192 Sturdevant v Paulsen, 218 F3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir 2000), quoting Mt. Healthy,
429 US at 280.
193 See notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
194 South Macomb, 790 F2d at 505. See also South Lake Tahoe, 625 F2d at 233 (holding that "political subdivisions of a state may not challenge the validity of a state statute
under the Fourteenth Amendment... whether the defendant is the state itself or another
of the state's political subdivisions") (internal citations omitted).
195 For a discussion of the inapplicability of the Trenton rule to inter-municipal suits of
the New Rochelle-Mamaroneck type, see Parts III B and III C.
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By analogizing an inter-municipal § 1983 suit to an action by
a city against its creating state, the rule obliterates the wellestablished distinction between cities and states."' In the first
place, the states do not need Trenton to protect them from the
§ 1983 assaults of insubordinate political subdivisions. Trenton
established that a city cannot claim the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment against its creating state;'97 Will established
that the states are not persons under § 1983.198 Enabling New
Rochelle to bring a § 1983 action against Mamaroneck to invalidate a local law does not threaten, or even implicate, either rule.
To see that this is true, consider a scenario under which a private
developer, rather than the city of New Rochelle,'9 9 sued to enjoin
enforcement of the permitting process established by
Mamaroneck. Under Owen and its progeny, it is clear that such a
suit-which directly challenges a discretionary, legislative function-is permissible under § 1983.200 Consequently, a court could
not interpret the claim as a challenge to the State of New York,
nor as a challenge to a statute passed by the New York state legislature.2 ' These facts do not change when the city of New Rochelle steps into the private developer's shoes. It is nonsensical to
nonetheless bar New Rochelle's § 1983 action on the grounds that
a city cannot claim the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
against its creating state.
This hypothetical brings the chief incoherence of municipal
status under § 1983 into stark relief. Under current law, municipalities do not have the power to sue each other because they do
not have the power to sue their creating states. Yet the immunity
of the states from suits by their political subdivisions or private
parties is well-established wholly apart from the question of the
powers of a state's political subdivisions.2 2 Indeed, Will makes it
clear that the states are not reachable under § 1983, and reaffirms the liability of municipalities under the statute.2 3 The non196

197
198

See Part IV A.
262 Us at 192.
491 US at 64.

199 New Rochelle involved, among other things, § 1983 claims by the City of New Rochelle against the neighboring Town of Mamaroneck. See 111 F Supp 2d at 357-58 (listing
the claims).
200 See note 48 and accompanying text.
201 Otherwise, the claim would run afoul of Will, under which the state is not a § 1983
person liable for constitutional torts. See 491 US at 64.
202 Will, 491 US at 64.
203 Id at 70 (holding that Monell is not undercut by the status of the states as nonpersons under § 1983).
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personhood of the states under § 1983 depends explicitly on the
Eleventh Amendment. 2 4 Thus, the denial to cities of a cause of
action under § 1983, though phrased in terms of limitations on
municipal power, is in fact an extension of Eleventh Amendment
immunity from the states to their political subdivisions. When
analyzed from the perspective of a city as a potential § 1983 defendant, rather than as a § 1983 plaintiff, the immunity cannot
be reconciled with the "warp and woof" of § 1983 jurisprudence2 5
or well-settled principles of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Further buttressing this argument is the fact that the precedents relied upon to prohibit § 1983 suits by municipalities precede decades of significant developments in both the enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment through § 1983206 and the treatment of political subdivisions under the Eleventh Amendment.
For example, both New Orleans Water-Works and Trenton speak
of political subdivisions as agents or instrumentalities of their
creating states." 7 It is that status which disables political subdivisions from suing their creating states under the Contract
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 s But under the Mt.
Healthy test, it is clear that instrumentality status does not
guarantee immunity from suit. Rather, determining whether an
instrumentality shares in its creator's Eleventh Amendment immunity requires an extensive inquiry into the nature of the entity

204

See id:

[Pirior to Monell, the court had reasoned that if municipalities were not
persons then surely States also were not. And Monell overruled Monroe,
undercutting that logic. But it does not follow that if municipalities are
persons then so are States. States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not, and we consequently limited are holding in Monell to local government units which are not considered part of
the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Conversely, our holding
here does not cast any doubt on Monell, and applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered arms of the State for Eleventh
Amendment purposes.
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
205 Monell, 436 US at 696.
206 See note 59 and accompanying text.
207 See Trenton, 262 US at 190 ("The distinction between the municipality as an agent
of the state for governmental purposes and as an organization to care for local needs in a
private or proprietary capacity has been applied in various branches of the law of municipal corporations.") (citation omitted); New Orleans Water-Works, 142 US at 91 (referring
to municipalities as "mere agent[s] of the state"); Regents of the University of California v

Doe, 519 US 425, 429 (1997) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment applies not only to the
States, but in "certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities").
208 These cases are discussed in Parts II A and III B.
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under the law of its creating state. °9 If, on the basis of such an
inquiry, a court determines that the state, rather than the subdivision, is the real party in interest, then the entity is immune as
if it were the state itself.21 °
Courts should undertake an identical inquiry to determine
whether and when a municipality or other political subdivision
can pursue a § 1983 claim against another political subdivision. If
a court determines that both the entity bringing suit and the entity being sued are "independent" under Mt. Healthy, then the
state is not the "real, substantial party in interest,"' and the suit
should go forward. Using Mt. Healthy to limit the range of § 1983
suits between political subdivisions will thus enable cities to enjoy the benefits of § 1983 personhood and nonetheless preserve
the sovereignty of the states.
C.

A Brief Survey: Mt. Healthy Applied

If courts employed a Mt. Healthy analysis to determine the
viability of inter-municipal § 1983 suits rather than granting
municipal defendants per se immunity, how would outcomes
change? A brief survey of several cases examined in this Comment suggests that the proposed rule threatens neither the sovereignty of the states nor the integrity of the precedents underpinning the prohibition of inter-municipal suits under § 1983.
Allowing municipalities to sue one another will not enable
them to sue their creating states. Under the proposed rule, Trenton and New Orleans Water-Works would remain undisturbed.
Furthermore, by using Mt. Healthy to determine the viability of a
§ 1983 suit brought by a municipality against another political
subdivision, any case in which a court determines that a city is
challenging the state itself will be resolved in favor of the state.2 12
This is merely an application of Will to § 1983 suits that municipalities may commence under the rule proposed in this Comment.2 13 Trenton involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
209 See Regents of the University of California,519 US at 429-30 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
210 See id at 429.
211 Id.
212 Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 280-81 (denying a school board Eleventh Amendment immunity). See also Parts IV A and IV C.
213 See Will, 491 US at 70 (holding that state immunity from § 1983 "applies only to
States or governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the state' for Eleventh
Amendment purposes" and referring to Mt. Healthy for purposes of making the determination).
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the State of New Jersey itself, which was a named defendant in
the suit. 14 The proposed rule permits § 1983 suits between "independent" political subdivisions, not constitutional suits by a subdivision against the state itself. Similarly, New Orleans WaterWorks involved a constitutional challenge to a state statute which
allegedly violated the Contract Clause.215 Under the proposed
rule, such a suit would be resolved in favor of the state, just as it
was in 1891.216
D. The Limits of Municipal Personhood and Federalism
Cities should have a cause of action under § 1983 only when
the target of the suit is not an arm of the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes and the other limitations of the statute are
met.2 17 One could argue that any § 1983 challenge to a municipalSee 282 US at 183-84.
142 US at 80-83. For a more recent example, consider the Seventh Circuit's decision in Village of Arlington Heights v Regional TransportationAuthority, 653 F2d 1149
(7th Cir 1981). Arlington Heights was one of the cases relied on by the South Macomb
court, see 790 F2d at 505. See also Part II B 2. In 1979, the Arlington Heights village
challenged a state statute and RTA ordinance levying unequal tax assessments. Arlington
Heights, 632 F2d at 1150. The Seventh Circuit held that Arlington Heights could not bring
suit because, under the Trenton rule, it could not use the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the validity of a state statute. Id at 1151-52. The village argued that this rule did
not apply because it was challenging an ordinance of the RTA-a political subdivision of
Illinois-and not a state statute. Id at 1152-53. The court rejected the argument on three
grounds: (1) the complaint stated that they sought to invalidate a state statute; (2) the
RTA could exercise only powers granted to it by the state, thus a challenge to the ordinance was a challenge to the state itself; and (3) the Trenton rule. See id at 1153.
It is clear from the facts of the case that the village's challenge was in fact directed
against a state statute and not the RTA ordinance. Id at 1150. The ordinance did not
define the taxes to be assessed and was merely a "vote" to impose taxes specifically authorized by the Illinois state legislature. Id. Applying a variant of the Mt. Healthy test to
the facts of Arlington Heights would likely produce the same outcome the court reached in
applying the Trenton rule. For example, under the variation established by the Tenth
Circuit, the court would examine both the degree of autonomy of the RTA under state law
and the extent of control exercised by the state; as well as the extent of financing the RTA
received independent of the state treasury and its ability to provide for its own financing.
See Sturdevant v Paulsen, 218 F3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir 2000). The Arlington Heights
opinion does not discuss the financing of the RTA, but with respect to the tax at issue, it is
clear that the agency had virtually no discretion outside of when the tax would be imposed. Arlington Heights, 653 F2d at 1150. Illinois state law established its terms, not an
RTA ordinance; the RTA merely voted on when to impose the tax. See id.
Although a court would have to examine this issue in greater depth, it appears
that, with respect to the tax, the RTA is an arm of the state under Mt. Healthy. Thus, the
result of Arlington Heights remains the same, but it is a result grounded in analysis
rather than rote application of the Trenton rule. On the other hand, in cases like South
Macomb and New Rochelle, municipalities should have a valid § 1983 cause of action.
216 Arlington Heights, 653 F2d at 1150.
217 See note 48 and accompanying text.
214
215
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ity is, in effect, a challenge to the state, since cities derive all of
their powers from the states that create them.218 This argument is
untenable for two reasons. First, it would eliminate any distinction between municipal action and state action-overturning Monell and rendering the arm of the state doctrine moot. Second,
political subdivisions cannot claim immunity simply because they
may exercise a "slice of state power." 19 Rather, courts must determine whether a political subdivision is entitled to immunity
from § 1983 after a detailed examination of the entity and the
action in question.22 °
This is not to suggest that federalism concerns evaporate
simply because cities are not arms of the state entitled to share in
the latter's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Tenth Amendment is also employed in the Supreme Court's efforts to safeguard the states from federal encroachments.221 Nonetheless,
whether invoked on Tenth or Eleventh Amendment grounds, the
Supreme Court has held that federalism principles are "no impediment to municipal liability" under § 1983.22 Any remaining
inconsistency between the status of political subdivisions and
New Federalism would require a reassessment of Monell, for it is
clear that private individuals and corporations can challenge
municipal policies under § 1983.23 While one could argue that
218

A portion of the Seventh Circuit's Arlington Heights opinion could be read to stand

for this proposition. The second ground for rejecting the village's case was that a constitutional challenge to an RTA ordinance enacted pursuant to a state statute was tantamount
to such a challenge against the state statute. Arlington Heights, 653 F2d at 1153. See also
note 215 and accompanying text. Read broadly, one could use this holding as a defense to
any municipal action against another political subdivision because any official action
taken by a city (such as passing legislation) can be traced back to a state statute.
219 See, for example, Lake County Estates v Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 440 US
391, 401 (1979) (denying Eleventh Amendment immunity to a bistate authority created by
Nevada and California on the grounds that the authority was not immune merely because
it exercised a "slice of state power"). To support the proposition, Justice Stevens cites Mt.
Healthy, 429 US 274; Moor v County ofAlameda, 411 US 693, 717-21; and Lincoln County
v Luning, 133 US 529, 530. See Lake County Estates, 440 US at 401 n 19. See also Cash v
Granville County Board of Education, 242 F3d 219, 222 (4th Cir 2001) (noting that Eleventh Amendment does not extend to "counties and similar municipal corporations.., even
if the counties and municipalities exercise a 'slice of state power") (internal citations omitted).
220 For a discussion of the mechanics of this determination, see Part IV B.
221 See generally NationalLeague of Cities v Usury, 426 US 833 (1976).
222 See Monell, 436 US at 691 n 54 (addressing federalism concerns and concluding
that neither the Tenth nor Eleventh Amendments prohibit municipal liability). In the
course of this discussion, Justice Brennan explicitly declared National League of Cities
"irrelevant to [the Court's] consideration of the case." Id.
223 Monell established the general liability of municipal corporations. See 436 US at
690. For the status of private corporations, see note 24 and accompanying text.
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Monell itself is inconsistent with federalism principals,224 it is the
law.
The only issue addressed here is whether, consistent with
current law and policy, municipalities should enjoy the same
right to bring suit as § 1983 plaintiffs that private citizens and
corporations already enjoy. One need not move beyond the
Court's § 1983 and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to determine that the denial of a § 1983 cause of action to independent
political subdivisions cannot be reconciled with either body of
law. Under § 1983, cities can claim virtually no immunity for constitutional torts; under the Eleventh Amendment, cities are not
arms of the state. Thus, the federalism principles militating
against municipal preemption suits are simply not implicated
when a city brings suit against another independent political
subdivision.
A final illustration will clarify the point. In New Rochelle, the
municipal act at issue was a local law passed by the Town of
Mamaroneck. The town passed the law pursuant to a state statute granting it the power to convene a local legislature and pass
laws.225 Yet the local law itself was not a law of the state of New
York, nor was New Rochelle's challenge an attempt to invalidate
Mamaroneck's general power to pass and enforce laws. Under the
expansion of municipal personhood advanced in this Comment,
New Rochelle would not be able to challenge a state statute mandating a permitting process identical to the one created by
Mamaroneck's local law. Such a suit-which would constitute a
direct challenge to a state statute-is simply untenable under the
Supreme Court's decision in Will.2 26 The power of a state to pass
laws affecting its political subdivisions would remain unchanged
by granting municipalities full personhood under § 1983.
CONCLUSION

More than twenty years ago, the Supreme Court determined
that cities are persons under § 1983, yet that personhood remains
incomplete. By operation of the Trenton rule-an anachronism of
the Court's early twentieth century jurisprudence--cities are uni224 See, for example, Durchslag, 43 DePaul L Rev at 618-23 (cited in note 182) (reviewing the inconsistent treatment of municipalities under the Court's federalism jurisprudence but concluding that treating local political subdivisions as part of the state under
the Eleventh Amendment 'would overrule Monell and thus immunize all political subdivisions from damage claims in federal court for violations of federally protected liberties").
225 The specific laws are not necessary for the purposes of the illustration.
226 491 US at 64 (holding that a state is not a person reachable under § 1983).
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formly denied the right to bring suit under § 1983. This Comment
has demonstrated the incoherence of that denial.
Rather than relying on Trenton, courts should begin with the
presumption that § 1983 confers a valid cause of action on municipalities. Such a cause of action will enable cities to better protect the interests of their citizens and will force local legislatures
to act with particular awareness of potential consequences to
neighboring jurisdictions.
Granting cities full personhood under § 1983 may raise fears
that opportunistic subdivisions would use the statute to encroach
on the powers of their creating states. However, courts have wellestablished tools at their disposal to prevent § 1983 plaintiffs
from using the statute against the states. So long as those tools
are used, any federalism concerns inherent in the proposed cause
of action are no greater than the federalism implications of a
§ 1983 action brought by any non-municipal § 1983 person.
Full § 1983 personhood is consistent with the Supreme
Court's recognition that the statute is designed to provide persons
the means to obtain broad remedial relief from constitutional
torts. Courts should no longer deny cities that relief.

